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Abstract
There is increasing evidence suggesting that Medicare beneficiaries do not make fully in-
formed decisions when choosing among alternative Medicare health plans. To the extent
that deciphering the intricacies of alternative plans consumes time and money, the Medicare
health plan market is one in which search costs may play an important role. To account
for this, we split beneficiaries into two groups—those who are informed and those who
are uninformed. If uninformed, beneficiaries only use a subset of covariates to compute
their maximum utilities, and if informed, they use the full set of variables considered. In
a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, we estimate
search cost coefficients based on the minimum and maximum statistics of the search cost
distribution, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and information heterogeneities
across eligibles. Our results suggest that, conditional on being uninformed, older, higher
income beneficiaries with lower self-reported health status are more likely to utilize easier
access to information.
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1 Introduction
When first established in 1997, the Medicare + Choice (M+C) program aimed to provide
beneficiaries alternatives to the standard Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) plans. Now termed
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, these provide at a minimum the same coverage offered by
standard Medicare FFS and often provide much more, but additional health plan benefits also
complicate each beneficiary’s choice. In shear number, the choice may be daunting. In 2002,
private insurance companies received 174 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
contracts to provide 452 different Medicare health plans for different areas across the US. Some
beneficiaries had over 60 different plans offered in their area. Plans can also offer a variety of
optional benefits, and although not all plans are available to all beneficiaries, it is clear that
the potential choice set is overwhelming for most people. In a study commissioned by AARP,
Hibbard and Jewett (1998) find that most beneficiaries do not fully understand the differences
between the standard Medicare FFS and M+C plans. More recently, Atherly (2001), Frank
(2004) and Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2006), among others, present strong survey evidence
suggesting that the choice set is overly complicated and that beneficiaries often do not make
fully informed decisions.
We account for these informational problems by adopting a consumer search model. With
data on Medicare plan choice, beneficiary information structure and demographic variables, we
split buyers into groups of informed and uninformed. If uninformed, beneficiaries only use a
subset of covariates to compute their maximum utilities, and if informed, they use the full set of
variables considered. Intuitively, we can treat all beneficiaries as being initially uninformed, and
through costly search, they can gain knowledge of other characteristics; however, since eligibles
have different search costs, not all beneficiaries want to search. This search process is similar to
Sorensen (2001), who studies search costs in the market for prescription drugs. Due primarily to
data limitations, however, he cannot study the effect of demographic variables on search costs,
while in our paper, we parameterize search costs and explicitly estimate search cost coefficients
based on the minimum and maximum statistics of the search cost distribution. The main
focus of this paper is to explain the primary determinants of these critical search cost values.
We estimate this model in a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and information heterogeneities across
eligibles.
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Our analysis provides two major contributions. One, we embed a heterogeneous search
process in a discrete choice model with taste differences. This provides a rich decision process
with multiple forms of buyer heterogeneity. And two, we determine not just how beneficiaries
gain information (as in the standard reduced form models) but also which types of beneficiaries
are closer to making informed decisions than others. Intuitively, imagine we want to assess
our favorite sports team’s performance. We might first look at wins and losses, which is what
the standard reduced form models tell us about a beneficiary’s information structure—are
beneficiaries informed or uninformed and what factors have the most influence? But there are
degrees of winning and losing, and knowing whether our team lost by 1 or 100 points makes
a difference. Our search model, in some sense, tells us the score. Specifically, if we consider
a search cost cutoff above which people are uninformed and below which are informed, we
find that higher income beneficiaries are most likely closer to the cutoff than lower income
beneficiaries, while beneficiaries with more assistance are more likely to have search costs well
away from the cutoff. These results provide strong insight into who would most benefit from
easier access to information and allow us to determine, of those that are uninformed, who needs
the least help to make an informed decision.
Search is certainly not the only avenue by which beneficiaries simplify their choice sets.
Gilbride and Allenby (2006), for example, develop a screening-rule model where beneficiaries
choose plans essentially in two stages. In stage one, they select a subset of plans based on
a screening rule, and in stage two, they choose the best plan in their new information set.
They apply this model to self-reported survey data. Li (2006) extends this by incorporating
demographic variables and devoting more attention to the development of the screening rule
mechanism. She also applies her model to realized choices rather than survey data of hypothet-
ical choices.
While both papers are important steps in developing more realistic choice models when
decisions are complicated, the underlying motivation for the screening rule is somewhat dis-
concerting. This assumes that people cannot fully understand the intricacies of each choice
and are burdened by “information overload.” To ease their decision, they screen their choices
and only look at some subset. In a search model, however, anyone can understand the options
available to them, but the cost of doing so may be substantial. The screening model also does
not differentiate between informed and uninformed buyers and, as such, cannot address which
types of buyers might be closer to making informed decisions than others.
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Moreover, in the Medicare health plan market, there is strong evidence that search may
play a role. First, there does seem to be some distinction between informed and uninformed
beneficiaries. When asked a series of questions regarding how intensively they tried to find plan
information, over half of our sample indicated making essentially no effort. Such beneficiaries
could not have made an informed decision—even if the decision were somewhat simplified by a
screening rule, they would still have to research whatever plans passed the first-stage screening
process. Second, there are significant differences across plans offered to each beneficiary, creating
a strong benefit for those beneficiaries deciding to actively research several different plans. For
instance, the average difference between the lowest and highest premium plans offered in a
beneficiary’s area is over $100. Similarly large differences exist for inpatient hospital care costs
($20.11), doctor and specialist co-pay ($13.32), and several services such as vision and hearing.
Third, as mentioned previously, many beneficiaries cite a strong lack of understanding with
their plan’s benefits, implying that they could not have thoroughly researched some of their
plan’s attributes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the
history of the Medicare Advantage program, Section 3 explains the basic search theory, Section
4 explains the data, Section 5 sets up the model, Section 6 explains the estimation process
and Section 7 summarizes the results. The Gibbs sampler algorithm and simulation results are
deferred to the Appendix.
2 Medicare History
Established in 1965, Medicare provides baseline medical coverage to individuals 65 years or
older or those with permanent disabilities. Until 1982, the only option for Medicare benefi-
ciaries was the basic Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS), which consists of two parts. All eligibles
are automatically enrolled in Part A, which covers hospital stays and skilled nursing facility
care, and in 2002, roughly 95% of beneficiaries also paid for Medicare Part B, the voluntary
supplemental program covering physician services, medical equipment, and most outpatient
hospital services. Most beneficiaries have already paid for Part A through payroll taxes, while
Part B usually requires an additional premium ($54 in 2002 and $96.40 in 2007). Since 2006,
beneficiaries can also receive prescription drug coverage through private drug plans (Medicare
part D).
4
Since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and revised in 2003 by the Medicare Modernization
Act, beneficiaries can enroll in private health insurance plans called Medicare + Choice (M+C)
plans. These plans are provided by private companies who contract with the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) yearly and are designed to replace the traditional Medicare FFS
plans. Contracts apply at the county level, and there can be multiple plans provided under
each contract. Since contracts are county specific, only those residents living in the county in
which the contract applies have access to the plans under that contract.
There are two different types of plans under the M+C heading–risk plans (e.g., Managed
Care plans—mainly Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organiza-
tion plans, Provider-Sponsored Organization plans and Private Fee-for-Service plans) and cost
plans. Risk and cost plans differ in that CMS provides a monthly payment to risk plans for
each enrolled beneficiary, while with cost plans, CMS only pays the cost of services in excess
of the standard Medicare FFS. Prior to the Medicare Modernization Act, however, most M+C
plans were Managed Care plans.1
In choosing their Medicare health plans, beneficiaries give up the traditional benefits of
Medicare FFS but must still enroll in Parts A and B. CMS also requires M+C plans to offer at
least what the beneficiary could receive from Medicare FFS. For 2002 coverage, open enrollment
was from November 1 to December 31, 2001. During this time, eligibles ages 65 years or older
without end stage renal disease (ESRD) could choose any plan available in their area. Limited
enrollment went from January 1 through June 30, 2002, where beneficiaries could still enroll in
M+C plans but only if the plan in question was accepting new members.2 During the limited
enrollment period, beneficiaries were free to switch plans but could only do so once. This
included switching back to the standard Medicare FFS. For example, a beneficiary could enroll
in November of 2001 and switch plans in May of 2002, at which point they were locked-in to
the new plan for the rest of the year. Beneficiaries might also move out of their plan’s service
area, in which case they could still receive coverage if the plan allows, or they must disenroll
and choose another plan in their new location or stay with Medicare FFS.
Since 2004, M+C plans have changed to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. Similar to
M+C, private companies provide these plans with contracts from CMS. The types of plans
1Other types of health plans exist, such as Health Care Prepayment Plans, but are strongly regulated by
CMS. For a detailed description of different types of plans, see the “Medicare & You” booklet published yearly
by CMS or “Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy” from MedPAC.
2Beneficiaries were generally only denied membership if the plan had previously set a maximum member
number and had already reached that limit.
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include Health Maintenance Organizations, Preferred Provider Organization plans, Private Fee-
for-Service plans, and Medical Savings Account plans. New plans include Regional Preferred
Provider Organization plans and Special Needs Plans. Any plans besides Private FFS and
Medicare Savings Accounts must offer at least one benefit package that includes prescription
drug coverage.
For the most part, standard Medicare FFS leaves the beneficiary with a large amount of risk,
often without dental, vision, long-term care, preventative care, or prescription drug coverage.
Parts A and B also require rather substantial deductables and co-payments and do not place a
maximum on out-of-pocket expenses. Due to this increased exposure, nearly 90% of beneficiaries
have some sort of supplemental coverage, either through Medicaid, Medigap, employer provided
insurance, or Medicare Advantage. For those enrolled in MA plans, they must pay the plan
premium and also enroll in Medicare part B and pay the part B premium. Despite the extra
premium, most MA plans offer significantly more benefits than the standard Medicare FFS.
In fact, in our dataset, 33% of MA plans charge no additional premium and still offer more
benefits.3
3 Literature Review
Due to the influx of Medicare beneficiaries, there has been increased attention paid to the Medi-
care Advantage market. This includes analyzing the enrollment decision process, the utilization
process, as well as the overall welfare effects of privately provided Medicare health plans. De-
spite the increased awareness and applicability, there is no consensus as to how beneficiaries
actually make their enrollment decisions. Initial studies, such as Atherly et al. (2004) and
Dowd et al. (2003), model this decision in a standard discrete choice framework (e.g., probit).
But due to strong evidence suggesting that beneficiaries do not make informed decisions, the
complete information assumption inherent in the standard discrete choice models has come
under question. Some attempts to address these problems include Frank and Lamirand (2007),
Gillbride and Allenby (2006), Lowenstein (1999) and Li (2006), all of which integrate concepts
from behavioral psychology (e.g., information overload or anxiety) into consumer decision pro-
cesses. Li (2006), however, is the only paper to use observational data rather than experimental
or hypothetical survey data.
3We treat Medicare Advantage and Medicare + Choice interchangeably, even though our 2002 data technically
only apply to the Medicare + Choice market.
6
Although not strictly related to behavioral psychology, the motivation for our approach is
similar. We acknowledge that beneficiaries are often not fully informed of all characteristics
across all possible decisions; however, contrary to the approaches above, we believe that all
beneficiaries are capable of being completely informed. The assumed computational capacity
of beneficiaries is an important difference between the screening and search models. In a search
context, the problem is that each person has a different cost of collecting information and
therefore may not make an informed decision.
3.1 Search Literature
Theoretically, consumer search first developed as an explanation for observed price differences
in seemingly homogeneous product markets. For instance, assume that several buyers are all
looking for the best price for some homogeneous good sold by several firms.4 Everyone knows
the distribution of prices but not the specific price of a given firm. If each buyer has some cost
of going from one firm to another, and this cost is different across buyers, then under certain
restrictions on the search cost and price distributions, there exists a price dispersed equilibrium.5
Using this theoretical background, Hong and Shum (2006) impose the equilibrium restrictions
in order to estimate the search cost distribution using only price data. They apply this analysis
to the online market for statistics textbooks and show that search may account for the observed
price dispersion in this seemingly homogeneous product market.
If we further assume that firms have some marginal cost differences, then price dispersed
equilibria exist under more general search cost distributions.6 Hortacsu and Syverson (2004)
exploit this theoretical setup in their study of search costs and mutual funds. Similar to Hong
and Shum (2006), they exploit equilibrium relationships in order to estimate the search cost
distribution in the market for S&P 500 index funds using both price and quantity (market
share) data. They do so under three general sequential search settings. One, they assume
funds are homogeneous and that each fund is equally likely to be sampled, in which case
cutoff search cost values come directly from the equilibrium restrictions of the model. Two,
they allow for some vertical product differentiation where plans remain equally likely to be
sampled. Here, given some additional marginal cost assumptions, search cost cutoffs are again
4There are two general branches of search—sequential search and fixed sample size search. We focus here on
the sequential consumer search rule. For a survey of both, as well as empirical studies, see Baye, Morgan and
Scholten (2006).
5See Rob (1985) and Stahl (1989) for more detail.
6See Be´nabou (1993) and Carlson and McAfee (1983) for more detail.
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estimated directly from equilibrium restrictions. And three, they consider homogeneous funds
with unequal sampling probabilities, and estimate the parameters of an assumed search cost
distribution using nonlinear least squares. This paper is particularly interesting as it integrates
consumer search and product differentiation; however, as Hortacsu and Syverson indicate, they
cannot consider taste heterogeneities along with search costs since their data do not provide an
exogenous source of variation for the search cost distribution.7
The main goal in these empirical search models is to estimate the search cost distribution,
usually in a structural model and usually in a nearly homogeneous good market, or to more
formally model the mechanism by which certain consumers are more informed than others.
There is currently little work, however, on the actual determinants of individual consumer search
costs. Moreover, the data considered in these models do not allow for both taste differences
across choices and heterogeneous search costs. This paper addresses both of these issues.
4 Data
The data for individual plan characteristics come from the Medicare Health Plan Compare
(MHPC) dataset. This is a freely available dataset collected by CMS. Since we use 2002
beneficiary demographic data, we use the beginning-of-year MHPC for 2002. We combine the
zip code and county code data with the benefit structure data to get one dataset consisting
of the Medicare plan contract, the plan id, the zip code and county code from which this
contract operates, and the benefit structure of each plan. The full dataset includes up to
38 different plan attributes for each plan under each contract, where there are 452 different
plan/contract combinations and 174 different contracts. Variable definitions and summary
statistics are included in Table 1, where we see that nearly 70% of plans offered some sort of
hearing, vision or prescription drug coverage, while less than 30% offered any dental coverage.
As mentioned previously, we also see the large range of premium, inpatient hospital care costs,
skilled nursing facility costs and doctor co-pay. In premium alone, the incentive to search could
exceed $300. Since all eligibles have access to the standard Medicare FFS, we treat this as the
baseline utility that anyone can obtain for free. We normalize the FFS premium to $0, and we
set the inpatient hospital care equal to $13.53 per day for the first 60 days and the doctor or
7Other empirical search studies include Wildenbeest (2006), which also estimates the search cost distribution
with vertically differentiated products, and Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2006). Lewis (2004) and Sorensen
(2001) also study consumer search but do not estimate the search cost distribution.
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specialist co-payment to $25 as per the 2002 “Medicare and You” booklet.
For informed beneficiaries, we consider premium (in excess of the $54 for Part B coverage),
prescription drug coverage, average doctor or specialist co-pay, vision services, dental services,
hearing services, home health care coverage, physical exam coverage, inpatient hospital care
costs and skilled nursing facility costs. We also combine general health education and acupunc-
ture into one variable named “extras”. These characteristics are commonly studied in the
Medicare literature. Due to little variability across plans, we do not use out-of-network cover-
age, chiropractic care or emergency room coverage in our analysis. For uninformed beneficiaries,
we assume they only observe premium, doctor and specialist co-pay and prescription drug cov-
erage. These were chosen for two reasons. One, the knowledge and needs supplement indicates
that the cost of medical services is the most important aspect to beneficiaries next to general
Parts A and B services—premium and co-pay are the most easily observed out-of-pocket cost
variables included in our analysis. Two, in the screening literature, there is strong evidence that
prescription drug coverage is a major screening variable.8 For these reasons, we use premium,
co-pay and prescription drug coverage as our covariates for uninformed beneficiaries.
We then combine these plan characteristics with individual beneficiary characteristics from
the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), Access to Care module. These data consist
of demographics such as age, income and race as well as self-reported health status and Medicare
use, as described in Table 2. We consider self-paying beneficiaries classified by CMS as “aged,
no ESRD”.
Using the county code and zip code data, we match beneficiaries to a specific plan and
choice set. We form the choice set by matching the contracts offered by county and zip code
with each beneficiary’s county and zip code of residence. Matching beneficiaries to specific
plans, however, is not as clear. The MCBS only has data on the contract under which the
beneficiary’s plan exists—not which plan was chosen. Therefore, we match plans to beneficiaries
by analyzing the deviation between each plan’s characteristics and the beneficiary’s perceived
plan characteristics.9 For some beneficiaries, however, this still does not uniquely match them to
one plan. In this case, we assume that beneficiaries choose the best plan in regard to premium,
prescription drug coverage, co-pay, vision, dental, hearing, physical exam coverage, inpatient
8See Li (2006) for more detail.
9The survey asks questions about how much the beneficiary pays per month and what type of prescription
drug coverage they receive. We use the answers to these questions to determine the “distance” from the benefits
available to the beneficiary and the benefits received by the beneficiary.
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hospital care costs and skilled nursing facility costs, in this order.10 Recall that we consider
only the first three characteristics for uninformed eligibles as they are assumed to never see the
remaining characteristics. If plans remain identical across these characteristics, we randomly
assign one of the remaining plans. We lose another 863 observations who are under contracts
that do not match the contracts available to them or who are matched to plans not offered
under their original contract.11 The final dataset therefore consists of N = 2, 234 beneficiaries,
970 of which are enrolled in the basic Medicare FFS and the remaining enrolled in a Medicare
health plan (managed care plan). From Table 2, we see that a large portion of our sample has
annual income between $5,000 and $25,000, education at or below a high school diploma, good
to excellent (self-reported) health status and few chronic diseases.
For data on search behavior, we use the beneficiary Knowledge and Needs survey. These
variables explain whether a beneficiary contacted Medicare prior to choosing their plan, whether
they accessed the internet, reviewed the plan quality charts, and other similar activities. Sum-
mary statistics are included in Table 3. This tells us how active beneficiaries are in finding
information, where we see that only 6% claimed to have looked for payment information and
only 5% claimed to have looked for benefit information. Over 43%, however, claimed to read
and at least partially understand the “Medicare and You” booklet.
To appropriately split beneficiaries into groups of informed and uninformed, we need to
determine which avenues a beneficiary can take to gain information. From the data available,
we determine 11 such avenues: (1) whether the beneficiary switched plans within the past
year, (2-4) whether they are informed of Medicare payment, benefit or coverage information,
(5) whether they are informed of HMO information, (6) whether they read the “Medicare
and You” booklet, (7-8) whether they looked at quality ratings or the plan information chart,
(9) whether they called the Medicare hotline, (10) whether they visited the Medicare website
(provided they have internet access), and (11) whether they have someone assisting them in
their Medicare decisions. Out of these 11 categories, we see from Table 4 that over 45% of our
sample made no observable attempt to gain information. Of the 600 that took only one avenue,
most of them read the “Medicare and You booklet”. And since the booklet is fairly general and
does not discuss individual plans, we assume that those beneficiaries who only read the booklet
10These characteristics are sufficient to match beneficiaries to plans, so we ignore health education and
acupuncture in our matching process.
11Most of these observations are those who have moved or switched plans throughout the year but who had
a plan prior to moving.
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still most likely made an uninformed decision. We therefore assume that anyone taking one
or less avenue to gain information is uninformed, leaving N1 = 627 informed beneficiaries and
N2 = 1, 607 uninformed beneficiaries.
5 The Model
There are i = 1, ..., N beneficiaries choosing between j = 1, ..., Ji different health care plans,
where each beneficiary has some search cost, ci > 0, and where the numbers and types of
plans available vary by zip code and county code. As mentioned previously, N is the sum of N1
informed buyers and N2 uninformed buyers. All N2 uninformed beneficiaries know only a subset
of plan characteristics as well as the maximum utility available to them if they decide to search,
while the N1 informed beneficiaries have full information on all plan characteristics. This type
of information structure is similar to Sorensen (2001), where buyers know the maximum utility
available to them but must engage in costly search to match plans with utility values.
Everyone has information on some characteristics but must engage in costly search in order
to become fully informed. In this sense, searching and making an informed decision are syn-
onymous. Since utilities and search costs are heterogeneous across beneficiaries, not everyone
finds it beneficial to search. Those that do not search therefore choose the best plan based on
a subset of characteristics. This subset determines the baseline utility that buyers can attain
with certainty and without search. Note that, since some attributes remain unknown without
search, uninformed beneficiaries may select plans that, had they been informed, would not have
offered the highest utility. The timing of the process is as follows:
1. Buyers form their own benefit of search, bi, determined by the difference between the
maximum utility available to them through search and the maximum available without
search.
2. Buyers decide to search or not, depending on their search cost ci. If ci < bi, then benefi-
ciary i searches.
3. If beneficiary i is completely informed, they choose the highest utility available. Otherwise,
they choose the plan offering the highest utility according to a subset of covariates.
Recall from Section 3 that the standard theoretical search model assumes buyers know the
full distribution of utilities available but are ex ante uninformed about which plans offer which
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utilities. In a sequential setting, buyers would go from one plan to the next searching for the best
deal and stop searching once the benefit to search is below their cost. The major differences
between our “all or nothing” search process and this standard theoretical search process is
two-fold. One, in our model, beneficiaries have knowledge of a subset of characteristics across
all plans. Therefore, beneficiaries need not search in order to look at more than one plan—
they must search in order to look at more characteristics. Two, if they search, they do so
exhaustively. In the Medicare health plan market, the assumption of exhaustive search is
perhaps not problematic as often data that are available for one plan are available for many
other plans at the same time. For instance, the Medicare website compares several plans
across whatever characteristics are chosen, similar to other websites such as plan prescriber
(www.planprescriber.com). The more likely decision may therefore be whether to search at all
instead of whether to search one more time.
To some extent, this search process is also data driven. We cannot allow for a fully sequential
search model because we can never be sure where different beneficiaries have searched. Even if
we knew how many plans someone looked at, there would be generally too many combinations
of different plans to identify utility and search cost coefficients. As discussed in Section 4, we
split beneficiaries into informed and uninformed groups based on how many avenues they took
to gain information, taking one or less implies they are uninformed while taking two or more
implies they are informed.
5.1 Utility Specification
We allow for two separate utility specifications, one for informed and one for uninformed benefi-
ciaries. In both cases, we adopt the standard random coefficient multinomial probit (RCMNP)
model.12 For informed buyers, the latent utility for beneficiary i is determined by
uij = xjβi + ij , (1)
where xj = (x1j , ..., xK1j)
′ is the K1×1 vector of plan characteristics, K1 is the number of plan
characteristics relevant for informed beneficiaries, and ij
iid∼ N(0, 1), independent of X. For
uninformed eligibles, denote by x˜j the subset of xj consisting of K2 characteristics on which all
beneficiaries are informed, with corresponding coefficients β˜i. Therefore, the latent utility for
12One important justification of the RCMNP model is to avoid Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
See Athey and Imbens (2007) for more detail.
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(uninformed) beneficiary i is determined by
u˜ij = x˜j β˜i + ˜ij . (2)
Again, ˜ and x˜j are independent for all j and ˜ij
iid∼ N(0, 1). We also assume that ˜ and  are
independent.
We specify the random coefficients for informed buyers as follows:
β′i = z
′
i∆ + νi, where νi
iid∼ N (0, Vβ) , (3)
where zi is the D × 1 vector of demographic variables, ∆ is a D × K1 matrix of common
coefficients, and Vβ is a K1 × K1 covariance matrix. The analogous equation for uninformed
beneficiaries is
β˜′i = z
′
i∆˜ + ν˜i, where ν˜i
iid∼ N
(
0, Vβ˜
)
, (4)
where ∆˜ is now a D×K2 matrix of common coefficients, and Vβ˜ is a K2×K2 variance matrix.
Note that this approach allows for demographic and plan characteristic interactions as well as
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We use demeaned values for demographic explanatory
variables. This simplifies interpretation so that the constant terms represent marginal utilities
for the average beneficiary. For instance, if x1 is premium, then ∆1 represents the marginal
effect of premium for a beneficiary of average age, average income, average education and so
forth.
5.2 Search Rule
Since buyers know their maximum utilities prior to search, but not which plan offers which
utility, the benefit from search is
bi = max{ui1, ..., uiJ} −max{u˜i1, ..., u˜iJ}. (5)
This is just the difference between the potential utility available through costly search and the
guaranteed utility everyone can obtain without searching. Since each beneficiary potentially
observes different utility values, each bi also differs across eligibles.
This benefit of search is also the minimum (for uninformed buyers) or maximum (for in-
formed buyers) search cost. Denote these minima and maxima for each i beneficiary by mi and
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m¯i, respectively. The main focus of this paper is to explain the primary determinants of these
critical search cost values. To do so, we specify the following functional forms:
m¯i = wiγ + µi,
mi = wiγ˜ + µ˜i, (6)
where wi is a 1 ×M vector of demographics for both informed and uninformed beneficiaries.
We assume the error terms, µi for informed and µ˜i for uninformed, are iid with µi ∼ N(0, σ2)
and µ˜i ∼ N(0, σ˜2).
We identify search cost coefficients through two avenues. One, the level of information is
observed in the data, as discussed in Section 4, so that beneficiaries are matched to one of
two information types. Two, we include in wi certain demographics that are excluded from zi,
such as the number of helpers assisting the beneficiary and race, so that there is an exogenous
source of variation within beneficiaries of a particular information structure. This provides
the necessary independent variation between search and taste heterogeneities, as mentioned
in Section 3. Our specification therefore introduces a second type of heterogeneity into the
standard discrete choice model, allowing for both heterogeneity in taste, due to the random
coefficients, as well as heterogeneity in information.
More generally, we assume a single search cost distribution from which all beneficiaries have
some unobserved search cost. We make no restrictions on this distribution and instead restrict
the minimum and maximum search costs (i.e., search cost cutoffs) to follow normal distributions.
From these minima and maxima, and from our assumed search process discussed previously,
we know on which side of these cutoffs each beneficiary lies. We can then determine, among
uninformed beneficiaries, who is most likely to benefit from small information improvements.
This tells us who needs the smallest push in order to become informed.
Figure 1 provides a graphical exposition. The distribution itself represents the full, uncon-
ditional search cost distribution, while the lines, ma and mb, represent the mean estimated
cutoff values for two uninformed beneficiaries (i.e., the minimum search costs). The true search
costs, sa and sb, lie somewhere to the right of the respective minima. To better understand our
results, assume that a given demographic component, w1, has the following relationship across
the two beneficiaries: w1a < w1b. For instance, beneficiary b’s income level exceeds that of
beneficiary a. Further assume that γ˜1 > 0, which in this case implies that income has a positive
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effect on uninformed beneficiaries’ minimum search costs. Therefore, beneficiary b has a higher
minimum search cost than beneficiary a, as depicted in the graph. It follows that beneficiary
b is more likely to have a search cost closer to their cutoff than beneficiary a, and we interpret
this to mean that beneficiary b is more likely to utilize easier access to information in order to
make an informed decision. We can also think of this in terms of the benefit to search, in which
case beneficiary a has a smaller benefit to search than beneficiary b. This implies that, if we
could lower the search costs of both people, beneficiary b would be more likely to search than
beneficiary a.
5.3 Decision Rule
To study the final decision rule, we denote by yi the plan chosen by beneficiary i. For yi = j,
we therefore know the following:
1. If uninformed, then the beneficiary’s utility is u˜ij = max{u˜ij , ..., u˜ij} and
mi = max{ui1, ..., uiJ} − u˜ij ,
and
2. If informed, then the beneficiary’s utility is uij = max{ui1, ..., uiJ} and
m¯i = uij −max{u˜ij , ..., u˜ij}.
To back out critical search costs, note that for uninformed buyers, all uij are formed by taking
the counterfactual—if beneficiary i were informed, then their utilities would be uij , ..., uiJ—and
similarly for informed buyers.
6 Estimation
To estimate utility and search cost coefficients, we use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) approach. We specify prior distributions for ∆, ∆˜, Vβ, Vβ˜, γ, γ˜, σ
2 and σ˜2 in order to
obtain draws from the posterior distributions. We follow Athey and Imbens (2007) as well as
Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby (1996) and Chib and Greenberg (1998) in our sampling algorithm.
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The basic idea is as follows:13
1. Draw latent utilities for informed and uninformed beneficiaries, {u1, ...,uN1} and {u˜1, ..., u˜N2}
respectively.
2. Draw corresponding random utility coefficients, βi for i = 1, ..., N1 and β˜i for i = 1, ..., N2.
3. Draw common coefficients ∆ and ∆˜.
4. Draw variance matrices Vβ and Vβ˜.
5. Form benefits {b1, ..., bN} as well as maxima, {m¯1, ..., m¯N1} and minima, {m1, ...,mN2}.
To form these values, we pose a counterfactual. For example, consider an uninformed
beneficiary with demographic variables z1. From the first 3 steps, we have an estimate
of max{u˜11, ..., u˜1J} and a draw of ∆. From z1 and ∆, we obtain a draw of β with mean
z
′
1∆. We then obtain draws of {u11, ..., u1J}, find the maximum of such draws and take
the difference from this maximum and max{u˜11, ..., u˜1J}. This difference provides a draw
of m1.
6. Draw search cost coefficients γ and γ˜.
7. Draw search cost variances σ2 and σ˜2.
In each step, we draw from distributions conditional on the previous coefficient draws. To draw
latent utilities, we use a combination of the inverse transform and accept/reject methods. If
beneficiary i was faced with 10 plans in their area, then we sample the 9 plans not purchased
independently from a normal distribution with appropriate means and unit variances. We then
sample the purchased plan using the inverse transform method, truncated below by zero. Then
we use accept/reject to ensure that the plan purchased provides the maximum utility. If not,
we redraw all 10 plans and check again. Although the accept/reject method takes longer per
iteration, it has been shown that the Markov chain converges faster than with Metropolis-
Hastings. We address convergence issues more formally in Section 7.
We use basic Medicare FFS as the default plan for all beneficiaries. This means that our plan
characteristic variables, xj and x˜j , are actually differenced by the level of each characteristic
offered under the standard Medicare FFS. Similarly, ij and ˜ij represent differenced error terms.
This normalizes the basic Medicare FFS plan to zero utility and implies that all other latent
utilities are relative to this base level.
13For a more formal discussion of our estimation procedure, see Appendix A.
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7 Results
We follow the steps from Section 6 for 50,000 draws. For ∆, ∆˜, Vβ and Vβ˜, we drop the first
10,000 draws and take each 20th draw to form the posterior distributions. In this case, the
Geweke Separated Partial Means (GSPM)14 test yields p-values above 0.5 for most coefficients
and above 0.1 for all coefficients, suggesting our simulators successfully converged to their
respective posterior distributions. Since draws of search cost coefficients depend strongly on
utility coefficients and variances, we drop an additional 10,000 draws for these coefficients. This
amounts to dropping the first 20,000 draws for γ, γ˜, σ2 and σ˜2. Similar convergence diagnostics
yield p-values above 0.3 for both informed and uninformed search cost coefficients. For all sets
of coefficients, we indicate consistency between the signs of the posterior means and signs of
posterior draws with a * if at least 80% of our draws are of the same sign as the mean and a
** for at least 90%. This gives us some feel for which coefficients are sufficiently far from zero.
7.1 Utility Coefficients
Results for informed beneficiaries are in Table 5, and results for uninformed beneficiaries are in
Table 6.15 These tables present the posterior means for ∆ and ∆˜, respectively, with posterior
standard deviations in parentheses. As mentioned in Section 5.1, all demographic variables are
demeaned so that the constant term represents the average effect across all beneficiaries. Also
note that Inpatient Hospital Care (IHC), Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) care and premium
are measured in $100s while doctor and specialist co-pay is measured in $10s. Therefore, for
informed beneficiaries, the constant for premium implies that the average informed beneficiary’s
expected utility decreases by 0.193 as the plan’s premium increases by $100, all else constant.
Similarly, expected utility for an average informed beneficiary decreases by 0.180 in response
to a $100 per day increase to stay in a Skilled Nursing Facility.
The remaining coefficients represent interaction terms between beneficiary demographics
and plan characteristics. For instance, consider the coefficient for the plan characteristic titled
“Extra” and the demographic variable “# Chronic Diseases”. The posterior mean of 0.042
implies that beneficiaries with more chronic diseases place more value on health education and
14The GSPM test determines whether the mean from the first 10% of the MCMC draws is identical to the
mean of the final 50% of the draws. See Geweke (2005) for more detail. We also ran the model with 75,000 draws
with no noticeable change in the results.
15For brevity, estimated covariance matrices for informed and uninformed beneficiaries are relegated to the
Appendix.
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acupuncture services than beneficiaries with fewer chronic diseases. Similarly, beneficiaries with
better self-reported health status care more about such services than those reporting poor health
(recall larger values of this variable indicate poorer health).
Posterior means for uninformed beneficiaries are given in Table 6, where we see that results
are generally further away from zero than for informed beneficiaries with smaller relative vari-
ances. The constant term still represents the average effect across uninformed beneficiaries. The
most important difference is premium, on which uninformed beneficiaries put far more weight
than informed beneficiaries. This makes sense as premium is one of the more easily observed
plan characteristics. Therefore, uninformed beneficiaries are much more attracted to lower pre-
mium plans. Specifically, a $100 increase in premium or a $10 increase in co-pay decreases the
expected utility of an average uninformed beneficiary by 3.541 and 0.352, respectively. For the
interaction terms, we see that uninformed beneficiaries in good health tend to value prescrip-
tion drug coverage more than beneficiaries reporting poor health. Also note the large negative
effect of co-pay for beneficiaries with diabetes. This implies that uninformed beneficiaries with
diabetes are more negatively affected by a high doctor and specialist co-pay than those without
diabetes, which is intuitively clear as these beneficiaries are more likely to need such visits. As
we discuss further in the next Section, this effect for diabetes has important implications for
search behavior.
7.2 Information Structure
We can now discuss search behavior and determinants of critical search costs, the main focus
of the paper. Posterior means of minimum search cost coefficients for uninformed beneficiaries
are included in Table 7. These minimum search costs represent the smallest possible search
cost a beneficiary could have had in order to still have made an uninformed decision. The
coefficients themselves represent marginal effects on these minima. Recall from our discussion
of Figure 1 that, for uninformed beneficiaries, a larger minimum search cost implies that this
beneficiary is more likely to have a search cost close to their minimum and vice versa for smaller
minimum search costs. Specifically, the positive coefficient for age means that being one year
older increases the expected minimum search cost by 0.005. Similarly, moving up one income
bracket increases the expected minimum search cost by 0.010. Self-reported health status and
race also have positive effects. Together, these results imply that older, higher income, African
American beneficiaries with poor self-reported health status are more likely to utilize easier
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access to information.
Conversely, employed beneficiaries with diabetes and extra assistance are less likely to utilize
improved access to information. For employed beneficiaries, this is intuitively clear as they may
have some non-medicare coverage through their employer. This also makes sense for those with
extra household assistance and diabetes as these beneficiaries are more likely to have someone
making their decision for them and therefore much less likely to search. Recall that this analysis
is conditional on being uninformed. Therefore, this does not imply that someone with diabetes
benefits less from search—only someone with diabetes who was observed to make an uninformed
decision.
Although our policy discussion pertains mainly to uninformed beneficiaries, we include
results for informed beneficiaries in Table 8. In this case, coefficients represent marginal effects
for maximum search costs—the largest possible search cost a person could have had in order
to still make an informed decision. Our interpretation in this case is slightly different. Here,
a lower maximum search cost implies that these beneficiaries must have relatively low search
costs in order to have made an informed decision. This also implies that such beneficiaries
were closer to making an uninformed decision. Therefore, since the posterior mean for diabetes
is negative and sufficiently far from zero, informed beneficiaries with diabetes are more likely
closer to making an uninformed decision than those without diabetes. A similar interpretation
holds for informed beneficiaries with more chronic diseases. This is somewhat surprising as we
might initially expect diabetics to have a very large benefit to search. Intuitively, however, this
result derives primarily from taste differences among diabetics, where we see from Table 6 that
uninformed beneficiaries with diabetes place substantial weight on co-pay and prescription drug
coverage. Therefore, utility differences between informed and uninformed are smaller for those
with diabetes as opposed to, for instance, someone with a strong education. In this case, our
assumption that uninformed beneficiaries still observe co-pay is important. If we eliminated
co-pay from the uninformed beneficiaries’ information sets, the benefit to search for diabetics
would be substantially higher.
As mentioned previously, the policy implication for our model is that older, higher income,
African American beneficiaries with lower self-reported health status need less help to go from
uninformed to informed. Note that this interpretation holds for uninformed beneficiaries and is
therefore conditional on the information structure. This does not mean that such a beneficiary
is more or less likely to be informed. It means that, conditional on being uninformed, these
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types of beneficiaries need less of a push in order to make an informed decision. This has
important policy implications if we imagine wanting to target beneficiaries most likely to use
new information. This result could not be attained, for instance, with a standard reduced-form
probit model using informed or uninformed as the dependent variable.16 Such a model would
only determine which types of beneficiaries are more likely to be informed or uninformed—not
who is closer to being informed conditional on being uninformed.
8 Conclusion
This paper introduces consumer search into a discrete choice model while accounting for horizon-
tal taste differentiation across plans. A major underlying premise is that information structures
are due both to general demographic characteristics as well as taste differences. We estimate a
RCMNP model where beneficiaries are either informed or uninformed and have different deci-
sion processes accordingly. Using these utility coefficients, we model a consumer search process
and estimate critical search cost coefficients.
Our analysis provides two main contributions, one of which is more econometric and the
last more policy oriented. One, due to strong differences across coefficients, there is evidence
that information heterogeneities are an important determinant of plan choice. Ignoring such
heterogeneities may have important implications. Two, we address these informational hetero-
geneities with a consumer search model while still accounting for horizontal taste differentiation.
This assumes that all beneficiaries are capable of understanding the health plans available to
them, but it may be overly costly for some of them to do so. This allows us to study how close
beneficiaries must have been to making an informed or uninformed decision. For example, our
search cost coefficients imply that higher income beneficiaries are most likely closer to their
threshold search cost values than lower income beneficiaries, while beneficiaries with more as-
sistance are more likely to have search costs well away from the cutoff. This implies that high
income, older beneficiaries with little household assistance will benefit more from easier access
to information than younger, low income beneficiaries with more assistance.
16For completeness, results for such a model, as well as for a standard count model using the level of information
as the dependent variable, are included in Table 9 in the Appendix.
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A Gibbs Sampler Algorithm
Denote by N(t, µ, σ2) a normal distribution truncated below by t and by N(t, µ, σ2) a normal distribution
truncated above by t. We consider the following conjugate (and diffuse) priors:
∆ ∼ N(0, V∆) ∆˜ ∼ N(0, V∆˜)
V −1β ∼W (µVβ , IK1) V −1β˜ ∼W (µ˜Vβ˜ , IK2)
γ ∼ N(µγ , Vγ) γ˜ ∼ N(µγ˜ , Vγ˜)
σ2 ∼ IG(a, b) σ˜2 ∼ IG(a˜, b˜)
Given these priors, we sample from the conditional distributions as follows:
u˜ij |x˜j , (yi = j), (φ = 0), β˜i ∼ N
(
max
l 6=j
{u˜il}, x˜j β˜i, 1
)
∀(i, j)
u˜ik|x˜k, (yi = j), (φ = 0), β˜i ∼ N
(
u˜ij , x˜kβ˜i, 1
)
∀(i, k 6= j)
uij |xj , (yi = j), (φ = 1), βi ∼ N (maxl 6=j{uil}, xjβi, 1)∀(i, j)
uik|xk, (yi = j), (φ = 1), βi ∼ N (uij , xkβi, 1)∀(i, k 6= j)
β˜i|u˜i, X˜ ∼ N
(
(X˜′X˜ + V −1
β˜
)−1(X˜′u˜i + zi∆˜V −1β˜ ), (X˜
′X˜ + V −1
β˜
)−1
)
βi|ui,X ∼ N
(
(X′X + V −1β )
−1(X′ui + zi∆V −1β ), (X
′X + V −1β )
−1
)
∆˜|β¯ =
(
β˜1, ..., β˜N2
)′
,Z =
(
(IK2 ⊗ z′1), ..., (IK2 ⊗ z′N2)
)′
∼ N
(
(Z′(IN2 ⊗ V −1β˜ )Z + (IK2 ⊗ V
−1
∆˜
)−1(Z′(IN2 ⊗ V −1β˜ )β¯), (Z
′(IN2 ⊗ V −1β˜ )Z + (IK2 ⊗ V
−1
∆˜
)−1
)
∆|β¯ = (β1, ..., βN1)′ ,Z =
(
(IK1 ⊗ z′1), ..., (IK1 ⊗ z′N1)
)′
∼ N
(
(Z′(IN1 ⊗ V −1β )Z + (IK1 ⊗ V −1∆ )−1(Z′(IN1 ⊗ V −1β )β¯), (Z′(IN1 ⊗ V −1β )Z + (IK1 ⊗ V −1∆ )−1
)
V −1
β˜
|β˜i, zi, ∆˜ ∼W
µVβ˜ +N2,
(
IK2 +
N2∑
i=1
(
β˜i − z′i∆˜
)(
β˜i − z′i∆˜
)′)−1
V −1β |βi, zi,∆ ∼W
µVβ +N1,
(
IK1 +
N1∑
i=1
(βi − z′i∆) (βi − z′i∆)′
)−1
Given ∆˜, V −1
β˜
, U˜,∆, V −1β ,U, we can then estimate minimum and maximum search costs. For all i =
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1, ..., N1, we proceed as follows:
β˜i ∼ N
(
zi∆˜, Vβ˜
)
u˜ij ∼ N
(
x˜j β˜i, 1
)
bi = max{ui1, ..., uiJ} −max{u˜i1, ..., u˜iJ}
m¯i|γ,wi ∼ N
(
wiγ, σ2
)
,
and similarly, for i = 1, ..., N2:
βi ∼ N (zi∆, Vβ)
uij ∼ N (xjβi, 1)
bi = max{ui1, ..., uiJ} −max{u˜i1, ..., u˜iJ}
mi|γ˜,wi ∼ N
(
wiγ˜, σ˜2
)
.
Finally, we sample γ, γ˜, σ2 and σ˜2 as follows:
γ|W,∼ N ((W′W/σ2 + V −1γ )−1(W′m¯/σ2 + V −1γ µγ), (W′W/σ2 + V −1γ )−1)
γ˜|W,∼ N
(
(W′W/σ˜2 + V −1γ˜ )
−1(W′m/σ˜2 + V −1γ˜ µγ˜), (W
′W/σ˜2 + V −1γ˜ )
−1
)
σ2|m¯,W, γ ∼ IG
(
N1/2 + a,
[
b−1 + (1/2)(m¯−Wγ)′(m¯−Wγ)
]−1)
σ˜2|m,W, γ˜ ∼ IG
(
N2/2 + a˜,
[
b˜−1 + (1/2)(m−Wγ˜)′(m−Wγ˜)
]−1)
.
B Simulation Results
To test our estimation procedure, we simulate a simple model with N = 2000 (1000 informed and 1000
uninformed) beneficiaries choosing among J = 5 plans, where beneficiaries have random coefficients
discussed in the model description. The data generating process is as follows.
• Plan characteristics for informed buyers
– Disease 1 Coverage: Binomial with P (X = 0) = 0.2, P (X = 1) = 0.6 and P (X = 2) = 0.2
– Disease 2 Coverage: Bernoulli with P (X = 0) = 0.5)
– (-) Premium: −expN(0, 1)
• Plan characteristics for uninformed buyers
– Disease 2 Coverage: Bernoulli with P (X = 0) = 0.5)
– (-) Premium: −expN(0, 1)
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• Demographics for both informed and uninformed
– Log of income: ln(40000) + ln(3000)1.96 N(0, 1)
– Disease 1 indicator: Bernoulli with P (X = 0) = 0.6
– Disease 2 indicator: Bernoulli with P (X = 0) = 0.5
• Outside good for both informed and uninformed
– Disease 1 Coverage: 1
– Disease 2 Coverage: 0
– Premium: $0
Our simulated data assume that the variance matrices of random coefficients for informed and
uninformed beneficiaries are .1× I3 and .1× I2, respectively, and the common utility coefficients are
Plan Characteristics
Demographics Disease 1 Coverage Disease 2 Coverage (-) Premium
Constant 1 -1 2
Log of Income (demeaned) 0 0 -0.1
Disease 1 (demeaned) 0.5 0 0
Disease 2 (demeaned) 0 0.5 0
for informed beneficiaries and
Plan Characteristics
Demographics Disease 2 Coverage (-) Premium
Constant 1 2
Log of Income (demeaned) 0 0.2
Disease 1 (demeaned) 0.2 0
Disease 2 (demeaned) 0 -0.2
for uninformed beneficiaries.
C Reduced Form Information Structure
As an initial assessment of beneficiary information structure, we consider a standard Poisson count model
with the level of information as the dependent variable and age, health status, income, education and
other demographics as the independent variables. Results are included in Table 9. A common problem
with the Poisson model, however, is that it underfits dispersion in the dependent variable. To account
for this, we run a Negative Binomial model, also included in Table 9. Although coefficients essentially do
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not change, a likelihood-ratio test for α = 0 concludes that there is significant evidence of overdispersion,
suggesting a preference for the Negative Binomial model.
The interpretations essentially do not change across the two models. We see that age is positively
related to gaining information, age (in tens of years) squared is negatively related, and that education and
the number of chronic diseases are positively related. More specifically, we see from the factor changes
that becoming one year older increases the expected number of information resources used by a factor of
about 1.2. Similarly, increasing education by one level (e.g., going from some college to gaining a college
degree) or having one more chronic disease increases the expected number of information resources used
by a factor of 1.07 and 1.11, respectively.
As a robustness check, we also form an indicator variable for whether the beneficiary is informed
or not, as per our definition of informed in Section 4. We do this because our consumer search process
similarly splits buyers into two groups, and we want to ensure that imposing this type of cutoff does
not drive our results. From the probit model, also included in Table 9, we see that for sign and signifi-
cance, most coefficients do not change. We conclude that any major differences between our search cost
coefficients and the probit or count model coefficients are probably not attributed to our assignment of
beneficiaries into one of only two groups.
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Figure 1: Predicted Minimum Search Costs for Uninformed Beneficiariesa
ma mb
0
f(s)
Search Costs
aThis depicts the movement of a predicted minimum search cost from ma to mb and represents the effect of
variables with positive search cost coefficients on the minimum search cost of a given beneficiary. The interpre-
tation is that beneficiary b is more likely closer to their minimum search cost than beneficiary a, and therefore,
beneficiary b needs less “push” (probabilistically) to make an informed decision.
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Table 1: Definitions and Summary Statistics for Plan Characteristic Variables
Variable Name Definition Measurement Mean Std Min Max
Premium Monthly premium (in
addition to Part B
premium)
Dollars $45.86 $43.76 $0 $304
Inpatient
Hospital Care
Average
out-of-pocket cost for
90 day stay in
hospital
Dollars $19.71 $60.81 $0 $295
Skilled Nursing
Facility
Average
out-of-pocket cost for
20 day stay in
skilled nursing facility
Dollars $9.27 $28.44 $0 $175
Co-pay Average doctor or
specialist co-payment
Dollars $12.94 $6.83 $0 $80
Variable Name Definition Measurement Percentage Mean
0 for no extra coverage 35.84 1.11
1 for some coverage 26.77
2 for one free service 28.10
Hearing Services Hearing services
covered (in addition
to basic Medicare
coverage) 3 for tests and hearing aids
free
9.29
0 for neither 21.90 0.80
1 for education/acupuncture 75.88
Extra Health education and
acupuncture coverage
2 for both 2.21
0 for no coverage 0.22 1.94
1 for some co-payment 5.53
Home Health Coverage for home
health care visits
2 for free home health visits 94.25
0 for no coverage 33.85 1.09
1 for generic coverage 23.67
Prescription
Drug Coverage
Total drug coverage
2 for generic and brand name
coverage
42.48
0 for no coverage 74.56 0.65
1 for some coverage 8.63
2 for one service free 5.31
3 for two services free 3.98
4 for three services free 4.20
Dental Dental services covered
5 for four services free 3.32
0 for no coverage 17.04 1.42
1 for some coverage 40.49
2 for up to two services free 25.66
Vision Vision services
covered (in addition
to basic Medicare
coverage) 3 for more than two services
free
16.81
0 for no coverage 2.88 1.36
1 for some co-payment 57.96
Physical Exam Routine physical
exam coverage
2 for no co-payment 39.16
N = 452
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Table 2: Definitions and Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables
Variable Name Measurement Mean Std
Age Years of age 76.30 7.30
GHPs available Total number of group health plans
available in beneficiary’s area
4.23 3.16
Risk plans available Total number of risk plans available
in beneficiary’s area
3.40 2.93
Number of helpers Total number of people reported to
have helped beneficiary in some way
0.63 0.77
Variable Name Measurement Percentage Mean
Income 1 for $5,000 or less 3.58 4.87
2 for $5,001 to $10,000 13.03
3 for $10,001 to $15,000 23.32
4 for $15,001 to $20,000 16.11
5 for $20,001 to $25,000 11.91
6 for $25,001 to $30,000 8.95
7 for $30,001 to $35,000 5.15
8 for $35,001 to $40,000 5.15
9 for $40,001 to $45,000 2.78
10 for $45,001 to $50,000 2.82
11 for $50,001 or more 7.21
Education 1 for no school 1.70 4.41
2 for no more than 8th grade 15.44
3 for some high school without diploma 17.82
4 for high school diploma 29.14
5 for technical or vocational school 6.27
6 for some college without degree 15.53
7 for associate’s degree 3.04
8 for bachelor’s degree 6.54
9 for post-graduate degree 4.52
General health status 1 for excellent 18.17 2.63
2 for very good 28.16
3 for good 31.78
4 for fair 15.98
5 for poor 5.91
0 51.12 0.67
1 33.93
2 11.91
3 2.60
Number of Chronic
Diseases
4 0.45
Diabetes 0 for no problems 81.42 0.19
1 for some problems 18.58
Employed 0 for no 88.36 0.12
1 for yes 11.64
Smoke 0 for never 36.97 0.63
1 for sometimes 63.03
Gender 0 for female 53.13 0.47
1 for male 46.87
White 0 for no 17.41 0.83
1 for yes 82.59
Black 0 for no 88.94 0.11
1 for yes 11.06
Other Race 0 if white or black 93.64 0.06
1 if neither white or black 6.36
N = 2, 234
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Table 3: Definitions and Means of Self-reported Beneficiary Information Vari-
ables
Variable Name Measurement Mean
Switch plans this year 0 if no 0.02
1 if yes
Very easy to understand Medicare 0 if no 0.19
1 if yes
Easy to understand Medicare 0 if no 0.42
1 if yes
Hard to understand Medicare 0 if no 0.21
1 if yes
Very hard to understand Medicare 0 if no 0.07
1 if yes
Informed of payment info 0 if no 0.06
1 if yes
Informed of benefit info 0 if no 0.05
1 if yes
Informed of Medicare coverage info 0 if no 0.07
1 if yes
Informed of HMO info 0 if no 0.04
1 if yes
Read “Medicare and You” book 0 if no 0.43
1 if yes
Looked at quality ratings 0 if no 0.07
1 if yes
Looked at plan info chart 0 if no 0.13
1 if yes
Called Medicare hotline 0 if no 0.13
1 if yes
Visited Medicare websitea 0 if no 0.03
1 if yes
aOnly pertains to those who own a computer with internet access
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Table 4: Tabulation of Beneficiaries’ Information Levels
Level of Informationa Frequency Percentage
0 1,007 45.08
1 600 26.86
2 300 13.43
3 185 8.28
4 92 4.12
5 28 1.25
6 15 0.67
7 6 0.27
8 1 0.04
N = 2, 234
aDetermined by the sum of 11 indicators: (1) whether the beneficiary switched plans within the past year,
(2-4) whether they are informed of Medicare payment, benefit or coverage information, (5) whether they are
informed of HMO information, (6) whether they read the “Medicare and You” booklet, (7-8) whether they
looked at quality ratings or the plan information chart, (9) whether they called the Medicare hotline, (10)
whether they visited the Medicare website (provided they have internet access), and (11) whether they have
someone assisting them in their Medicare decisions. Anyone with 1 or less such attempt to find information is
assumed to be uninformed.
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Table 6: Utility Coefficients for Uninformed Beneficiariesa
Posterior Meansb
Demographic
variablesc
Premium Co-pay Pres. Drug
Constant −3.541∗∗ −0.352∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(0.370) (0.163) (0.171)
Age −0.030∗∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Education −0.079∗ −0.010 0.014
(0.079) (0.042) (0.044)
Income 0.149∗∗ −0.041∗∗ 0.012
(0.055) (0.032) (0.033)
Health Status 0.241∗∗ 0.204∗∗ −0.140∗∗
(0.123) (0.069) (0.074)
Smoke −0.372∗ -0.022 0.104
(0.289) (0.159) (0.170)
Diabetes −0.199 −0.361∗∗ 0.241∗
(0.313) (0.181) (0.197)
Male 0.385∗∗ 0.289∗∗ −0.463∗∗
(0.291) (0.158) (0.180)
# Chronic Diseases −0.301∗∗ −0.153∗∗ 0.071
(0.195) (0.107) (0.105)
aUninformed beneficiaries are the 1,607 beneficiaries that tried in no more than 1 way to gain information.
bStandard deviations are in parenthesis. A * or ** indicate at least 80% or 90% of draws are of the same
sign as the posterior mean. All values represent marginal effects on utility for uninformed beneficiaries–for the
constant, these are average marginal effects across all demographic variables.
cAll demographic variables are demeaned in order to simplify interpretation.
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Table 7: Critical Search Cost Coefficients for Uninformed Beneficiariesa
Posterior Meansb
Constant 0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Age 0.005∗∗
(0.004)
Education 0.007
(0.012)
Income 0.010∗∗
(0.009)
Health Status 0.016∗
(0.021)
Smoke 0.012
(0.048)
Diabetes −0.040∗
(0.053)
Helpers −0.046∗∗
(0.024)
Male −0.028
(0.046)
White −0.021
(0.058)
Black 0.143∗∗
(0.077)
Job −0.043∗
(0.051)
# Chronic Diseases −0.009
(0.025)
Age2 −0.001
(0.004)
aUninformed beneficiaries are the 1,607 beneficiaries that tried in no more than 1 way to gain information.
The critical search cost represents the smallest possible search cost a person could have had in order to still make
an uninformed decision. The coefficients presented represent marginal effects of these critical search costs.
bStandard deviations are in parenthesis. A * or ** indicate at least 80% or 90% of draws are of the same
sign as the posterior mean.
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Table 8: Critical Search Cost Coefficients for Informed Beneficiariesa
Posterior Meansb
Constant −0.000
(0.001)
Age 0.001
(0.005)
Education −0.003
(0.011)
Income 0.006
(0.008)
Health Status 0.006
(0.019)
Smoke 0.001
(0.044)
Diabetes −0.061∗∗
(0.045)
Helpers −0.008
(0.025)
Male −0.025
(0.046)
White −0.011
(0.095)
Black −0.068
(0.105)
Job 0.038
(0.060)
# Chronic Diseases −0.021∗
(0.024)
Age2 0.001
(0.005)
aInformed beneficiaries are the 627 beneficiaries that tried in more than 1 way to gain information. The
critical search cost represents the largest possible search cost a person could have had in order to still make an
informed decision. The coefficients presented represent marginal effects of these maximum search costs.
bStandard deviations are in parenthesis. A * or ** indicate at least 80% or 90% of draws are of the same
sign as the posterior mean.
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Table 9: Poisson, Negative Binomial and Probit Regression Results
Poissona Negative Binomiala Probitab
Coefficient Factor Change Coefficient Factor Change Coefficient Marginal Effectc
Age 0.170∗∗∗ 1.185 0.141∗ 1.151 0.122∗ 0.048
(0.062) (0.075) (0.069)
Health Status −0.023 0.976 −0.029 0.972 −0.055∗∗ −0.022
(0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
Male −0.095∗∗ 0.909 −0.099∗ 0.906 −0.021 −0.008
(0.045) (0.058) (0.059)
White 0.246∗∗ 1.279 0.231∗ 1.260 0.177 0.070
(0.097) (0.119) (0.112)
Black 0.002 1.002 −0.007 0.993 0.057 0.023
(0.117) (0.143) (0.134)
Education 0.067∗∗∗ 1.069 0.067∗∗∗ 1.069 0.066∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Income 0.005 1.005 0.008 1.009 0.014 0.005
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
# Chronic Diseases 0.100∗∗∗ 1.105 0.100∗∗∗ 1.106 0.091∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.025) (0.033) (0.035)
Employed −0.113∗ 0.892 −0.107 0.899 −0.099 −0.039
(0.066) (0.084) (0.089)
Smoke 0.039 1.040 0.043 1.044 0.094 0.037
(0.046) (0.059) (0.060)
# of Helpers −0.010 0.990 −0.010 0.990 −0.012 −0.005
(0.031) (0.039) (0.040)
Diabetes 0.023 0.977 0.025 0.975 0.021 0.008
(0.054) (0.069) (0.071)
Age2 −0.123∗∗∗ 0.884 −.105∗∗ 0.901 −0.089∗∗ −0.035
(0.040) (0.048) (0.044)
Constant 1.262 1.300 −4.385
(0.288) (0.369) (2.715)
α 0.568
-Log Likelihood 3267.79 3145.85 1491.25
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.016 0.030
N 2234 2234 2234
aResults are from a count model with the number of attempted ways to find information as the dependent
variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of significance are indicated by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
bResults are from a zero/one dependent variable equal to one if beneficiary engaged in 2 or more activities
to gain information and zero otherwise.
cMarginal effects calculated at mean values. For dummy variables, marginal effects represent changes from
0 to 1.
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Table 11: Covariance Matrix for Uninformed Utility Coefficientsa
Posterior Meansb
Premium Co-pay Pres. Drug
Premium 3.102∗∗
(2.238)
Co-pay −0.274 2.197∗∗
(1.703) (2.925)
Pres. Drug −1.320∗∗ −1.709∗∗ 2.763∗∗
(2.250) (3.031) (2.961)
aUninformed beneficiaries are the 1,607 beneficiaries that tried in no more than 1 way to gain information.
bStandard deviations are in parenthesis. A * or ** indicate at least 80% or 90% of draws are of the same
sign as the posterior mean.
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